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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
F'RANK BAlKE, 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
and Appellant, 
GEORGE BJ:;;CKSTK,1., D, Sheriff 
of Sv.lt L<Jke County, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Ca:-;e 1\" o. 8049 
PETITIOK FOR REHEARING AND 
A:viiCUS CURIAE TIRmF OF' THE STATE OF 
UTAH IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On the lOth day of December, 1959, this Court ren-
dered its decision in the above entitled cause wherein it 
affirmed the order of the District CoUTt of the Third Ju-
dicial District, dismissing the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
obtained by Frank Baine. In the public interest, to clarify 
the limitations of this decision cmd in order that the At-
torney General, as legal counsel and representative for 
those state agencies which have to do with the enforcement 
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2 
and administration of the criminal law, may have a guide-
post relative to the pertinency and applicability of this 
decision, this petition and request for rehearing is taken 
for and on account of the points and grounds hereinafter 
set forth. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Little time need be spent in setting forth the facts of 
the instant case except that we deem it relevant to add 
the following: 
Frank Baine, after having been sentenced to an in-
determinate term in the Utah State Prison, was placed 
under the supervision and custody of the Utah State Adult 
Probation and Parole Department. Baine was given a stay 
of execution for a definite time certain, and such periodic 
stays were extended by order of the District Court subse-
quent thereto until the natural lapse and expiration of 
final stay of execution on March 27, 1959. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
AN INDIVIDUAL HAVING BEE::-.J" GRANTED 
AND ORDERED A STAY OF EXECL'TION OR 
PROBATIO::-.J" I::-.J" THE DISCRETION OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT, F.OR A DEFINITE TIME 
CETITAI~, MAY BE COMMITTED UPON THE 
EXPIRA'T'IOI'\ OF SUCH PERIOD WITHOl:T A 
HEARING BEING A CONDITION PRECEDENT 
THERETO AND WITHOUT VIOLATION OF 
THE TI\'DIVIDUAL'S FU:-:IDAMENT AL RIGHTS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AK J_:\[DIVIDl~AL HAVING BEEN GRANTED 
AND ORDERED A STAY OF EXECUTION OR 
PROBATION II\ THE DISCRETION OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT, FOR A DEFINITE TIME 
CERTAI='f, MAY BE COMMITTED UPON THE 
EXPIRATION OF S"CCH PERIOD WITHOUT A 
HEARING BEING A CONDITION PRECEDENT 
THERETO AND WITHOUT VIOLATION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL'S FUNDAME)[TAL RIGHTS. 
The District Court of the State of Utah may exercise 
its discretion, upon the entering of the judgment of con-
viction, in its determination whether to commit the de-
fendant immediately to the proper state authorities or 
suspend sentence and place the defendant on probation. 
The applicable statute has been brought to this Court's 
attention heretofore, but we deem it of necessity to reiter-
ate those provisions which we deem critical to a proper 
determination of this case. 77-35-17, U.C.A. 1953, provides 
in part: 
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime 
or offense. if it appears compatible with the public 
interest, the court having jurisdiction may suspend 
the imposition or the execution of sentence and 
may place the defendant on probation for such 
period of time as the court shall determ.ine. 
The court may subsequently increase or decrease 
the probation period, and may revoke or modify 
any condition of probation. "' "' ~ (Emphasis added). 
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The Legislature of this state, by and through the 
above mentioned statute, make:,; no distinction as to the 
status of an individual in respect to whether he is granted 
limited fr·ecdom under a stay of exerution or probation 
under a suspension of sentence, but rather, the 8ection 
authorizes the O>urt to suspend the imposition or execu-
tion of 8entencc and to place the defendant on probation 
for such period of time as the Court shall determine. It 
is noted, in this connection, that the Court is in no way 
required to place a defendant on probation for an unlimit-
ed time during good behavior; the statute is clearly of 
a discretionary temper. 
It is our contention that a comprehensive review of 
the Utah decisions would be timely, none having been 
made heretofore. While the appellant and original peti-
tioner herein has oft quoted and eloquently cited the rele-
vant decision.'l in his argument which sets forth a beautiful 
message in and of itself, the quotations are quite out of 
context with the analyc·es made in such decisions and are 
hardly accurate. VV1th due respect to this Court, and 
realizing the obligation of this office prescribed by law, 
it is the contention of your petitioner that the rule of law 
in this jurisdiction is that a limited period of probation 
and subsequent commitment upon the natural expiration 
thereof does nDt invDlve the revocation of the probation-
ary order, nor does it require a hearing. 
In any determination Df this magnitude the classic 
decision of State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044, 
54 ALR 1463 must of necessity be considered. Zolantakis, 
on July 2:\, 1925, pleaded guilty to being a persistent 
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violator of a law prohibiting the manufacture and use of 
intoxicating liquors; judgment was pronounced and sen-
tence wa~ suspended "during the good behavior of said 
defendant." During the eXistence of such probation an 
order was issued by the District Court to show cause why 
the suspension under the sentence should not be vacated 
and set aside. 
A summary hearing was held on such order; how-
ever, the defendant was not questioned or asked to respond 
or deny in any way the alleged acts of misconduct, nor 
was he advised of the purpose and of the reason for the 
issuance of the order, nor was he allowed to cross examine 
the State's witnesses. The conclusion and holding of the 
Court was that Zolantalcis must be accorded a hearing 
surrounding the reasons for the revocation of the suspen-
sion of sentence and that the District Judge must grant a 
probationer an opportunity to deny and rebut the State's 
evidence prior to issuing an order revoking suspension. 
This decision ·we deem to be entirely correct as to the facts 
presented therein, but completely inapplicable in the case 
at bar. Frank Baine had never been placed on probation 
during good behavior and for an indefinite period-
specifically he had been granted successive stays of exe-
cution, and the controversy in this Court surrounds the 
failure of the District Judge- to grant an additional stay. 
This decision is clearly within the province of the District 
Judge, and we distinguish ZolantakL; on this basis. 
The case of Williams v. HarTis, 106 Utah 387, 149 
P.2d G40, presents a different set of facts. Appellant was 
convicted of burglary, and judgment entered thereon; the 
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District Court suspended sentence on December 12, 19~2, 
and ordered him to report back to the Court on Febru8.ry 
6, 1933. On the latter date the Court issued an order sus-
pending sentence, and thereafter additional stays of exe-
cution were granted, the last conunencing on September 
25, 1933 and terminating December 18, 1933. On October 
22, 1933, Williams appeared before the Court to explain 
the commission of a crime recently committed by him in 
a sister county during the probationary period. Upon the 
admission of Williams, the Court revoked probation. This 
Court quoted approvingly therein from Zolantakis and 
upheld the revocation of the suspension of sentence by 
the Dh:>trict Court. Does the Willi= case stand <L~ author-
ity for the instant situation? The quick answer to this 
question is, of course, that it does not, for the facts therein 
dealt specifically with the revocation of suspension of 
sentence, and the Court was not concerned with the natur-
al expiration of an order suspending sentence from a 
definite date to a definite date. 
Likewise, McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 
721, is limited by its facts to the revocation, cancellation 
and rescission of a parole by the Board of Pardons, 
Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155 P.2d 721, sets 
forth what we believe to be of controlling consideration 
in this case. Demmick was convicted of burglary and 
sentenced to an indeterminate term; sentence was pro-
nounced and petitioner was thereupon granted a stay 
of execution until January 4, 1943, Kovember 28th, 1942, 
having been the date of sentencing. On the former date, 
the Court ordered Demmick committed to Prison after a 
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conversation with him in Chambers. On ha:beas corpus 
the petitioner contended that the Court, having placed him 
on probation, did so during "good behavior" and that he 
w<is, therefore committed without proper hearing. The 
language of this Court in that case merits consideration: 
"The primary question therefore is: VVas appellant 
on the date of sentence, granted an indefinite stay 
of execution and placed on probation during good 
behavior. * * * 
The question must be an;;wered in the negative. 
The order, itself, specifically makes the stay one 
until a definite time* * "'·" (Emph<.~~is added). 
The Court determined that Demmick was in no way placed 
on probation during good behavior: 
"'Nor do we see anything irregular in the Court's 
action in thi;; case in requiring compliance with 
conditions usually imposed on those placed on pro-
bation during good beh;nc!or, ;_·;; a condition to the 
keeping force of the stay order until the date of its 
expiration." 
The majority opinion in the present case discusses gener-
ally the holding in Demmick v. Harris. We submit that 
the rule promulgated and handed down by this Court in 
the latter decision is and should be the controlling prin-
ciple in this case. That the District Court may, in its ab-
solute and uncontrolled discretion, place an inidividual on 
probation for a definite period, and that upon expiration 
of such period, commitment must of necessity follow un-
less a further suspension is granted, is the final product 
of Demmick v. Harris. 
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Chief Justice Larson, by his concurring opinion in 
Dernrnick, stated: 
"Such smy of execu.no;t operated cnly to delay 
commiLrr,ent until the day eertain fixed in the stay. 
At the expiration of that time, commitment issues 
a~. of course, unless the Court by order granL~ a 
further stay." 
The language in the main opin10n on the original 
hearing of the instant matter would seem to indicate that 
several members of this Court considered the question of 
revocation of probation to be before them. Crockett. J. 
writes: 
"The question is: What procedure should be 
followed in connection with the revocation of 
probation." 
In order to give to this statement its full value and weight, 
the meaning of the word "revocation," as generally ap-
plied, should be considered. "Revocation" normally means 
or has reference to the following: Recall, make void by 
taking back or calling back, reverse, cancel, rescind, an-
nul. llalfm.oon v. Moore, 77 Ida. 247, 291 P.2d 846; Com-
mercial TTWJt Company of Pittsburgh, u. U.S., 96 F. Supp. 
712. 717 (D.C. Pa.); In Re Barrie's Will, 393 Ill. 111, 65 
N.E.2d 433, 435. ;.Jot one of these descriptive phrases or 
words is an adequate m.easuring stick of the stay of e:xecu-
tion of U1e District Court in the case at bar, for such stay 
expired of its own motion and without further action or 
order. It i~ to go a long "''ay to say that a District Court 
in the State of Utah, haYing once granted a stay of execu-
tion for a definite time certain, and having not permitted 
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an unlimited probation during good behavior, has essent-
ially issued an irrevocable order which must be continued 
after and subsequent to its natural expiration and lapse 
unless a hearing be had; such, we believe, is not in har-
mony with the statutory discretion bestowed upon the 
Court. 
To apply the reasoning of Zolantakis to the instant 
facts is to create a right in Baine which was non-existent 
heretofore and to extend its rule to an area not intended to 
be encompassed. This Court, in Christiamen v. Harris, 
109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314, in discussing State v. Zolantakis, 
commented: 
"There is an ever present tendency to expand such 
stzttements to apply to ca~.c3 Vi herein the facts are 
entirely different * * *. \Ve are not inclined to 
expand the force of such holdings beyond what 
the court intended when the cilse wa:> decided. 
That case stands for the following proposition: 
That a person upon probation without limitation 
has a vested right in hi~ personal liberty so long 
as he does not violatce the conditions upon ·which 
that liberty was granted. * "" *" (Emphasis added). 
Further, Justice Wolfe, an eminent jurist in anyone's 
record, said in a concurring opinion: 
"I have expressed my willingness to go along with 
the Zolantakis case if it is construed only as re-
quiring that before probiltion is revoked the pro-
bationer be given a hearing on the question of 
whether he has violated the conditioru of his 
probation." (Emphasis added). 
(Christiansen v. Harris, supra.). 
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We do note that the main opm10n in the original 
hearing briefly discusses the distinction between a stay Of 
execution to a definite date and a suspended sentence for 
an indefinite period, but the determination by the Court 
in this regard is not clear. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court of Salt Lake County issued a stay 
of execution for a definite time certain to Frank Baine, a 
petitioner herein. Such stay of execution expired without 
the Court taking any further action. Notice of such ex-
piration and a hearing thereon were not, therefore, neces-
>;ary. It is the contention of the State of Utah that the 
ruling of this Court be in accordance with the arguments 
expressed herein. 
Your petitioner has not intended to specifically an-
swer the petition and brief of Frank Baine, except to the 
extent that thi:-; argument negatives such. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
\.VALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
ROBEH.T S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF UTAH 
Amicus Curiae 
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